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Abstract 
 
This paper uses a sample of matched data of firms-banks in China over the period 
1999-2012 to determine the drivers of firms switching behaviour from one bank 
relationship to another. The findings conform to the extant literature and therefore 
indicate that the switching behaviour of Chinese firms is no different to firms 
elsewhere. The results show that the principal driver of a switching action is the credit 
needs of the firm and a mixture of firm and bank characteristics. The findings support  
the extant literature that less opaque firms are able to switch more readily than opaque 
firms. The results also suggest that banks that develop there fee income services are 
more effective in locking-in their borrowers. 
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1. Introduction 
   Switching costs, which arise from the asymmetry of information between firms and banks, 
act as the glue for the bank-firm relationship (Shy, 2002; Kim et al, 2003; Vesala, 2007). The 
confidentiality associated with the customer-loan relationship allows banks to exploit their 
informational advantage over competitors and lock-in their incumbent customers to earn 
higher positive expected profits on repeated lending. A number of previous studies have 
pointed out that a large proportion of firms have considered switching to another bank to 
overcome the lending constraint placed on them by their existing provider. However, a strong 
bank-firm relationship gives the bank an informational advantage in its relationship with the 
firm. Firms will face a non-favourable loan offer with higher interest rate from outside banks 
because of incomplete information about the firms’ financial condition. For outside banks it is 
hard to distinguish ‘good’ and ‘bad’ firms. The informational disadvantage and lock-in 
strategy by the incumbent bank can limit the ability of the firm’s access to external finance. 
Yet, firms switching their relationship banks have also been widely observed in the lending 
market.   
 
Plainly a long-term and stable bank-firm relationship is not the only choice for firms. They 
have high a probability to switch when they face severe financial constraints which cannot be 
resolved by the existing bank. The longer the existence of the incumbent relationship, the 
higher the probability that the borrower will find another lender (Greenbaum et al., 1989). 
Since the switching costs arising from asymmetric information makes the switching action 
costly, the switching behaviours are observed heterogeneity in firms. Firms’ transparency, 
external fund requirement and financial characteristics are the factors that drive the decision 
to switch lenders. However, the banks’ lending decisions are not homogenous. This paper 
aims to model the factors that drive firm’s switching behaviour. The research question this 
paper poses is, why do firms switch banks, and what kinds of banks do they prefer to form a 
new relationship with. 
 
As with many emerging economics bank credit remains the main funding source for firms in 
China (Allen et al, 2005). The opacity of business in China, and information asymmetry are 
viewed by some as the key impact variables that define the lending relationship (Chang et al, 
2009; Cao et al, 2010). But it is not simply the characteristics of the firm that matter, the 
lending bank’s identity influences the lending decision and determines the quality of the 
bank-firm relationship (Hao et al, 2013).  
 
The reform period beginning from 2001 has made remarkable improvements in the 
performance of the banks, especially for the large commercial banks. The average non-
performing loan ratio of the major commercial banks in China decreased from 17.9% in 2003 
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to 0.9% in 2011. Unlike in the past where the banks were slaves to the socialist plan, Chinese 
commercial banks have focussed on credit quality when making lending decisions (Chang et 
al, 2009). Banks collect more information about firms’ private financial information in order 
to minimise the associated lending risk.  
 
The topic why firms switch banks is a relatively unexplored area of research. This paper 
attempts to make a contribution to fill this gap. This study examines more than 2000 matched 
firm-bank lending deals during the period 1999-2012. The principal findings are that (i) firms 
usually switch banks for larger amount of loans and longer lending durations; (ii) large firms, 
that are usually more transparent, have a higher probability to switch than small firms; (iii) 
strong financial conditions of the firm increases the likelihood of forming a new bank 
relationship; (iv) firms are more likely to switch to small market share banks, or lower 
profitability banks to seek more favourable lending contracts; (v) firms are less likely to 
switch to banks that offer a bundled service of loan and services in order to avoid lock-in 
problems.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the relevant theoretical 
foundation and empirical researches on asymmetric information, bank-firm relationship and 
the determinants of firms switching decisions; section 3 describes the methodology and 
summarizes the main hypotheses of this study, and introduces the models setting for empirical 
studies; section 4 describes the data; section 5 presents the empirical results; and section 6 
concludes.  
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Lending relationship with asymmetric information  
    Many researches claim that asymmetric information between the firms and banks create 
barriers for borrowers to switch lenders. Kim et al (2003) claim that switching costs mainly 
arise from asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders incurred when economic 
agents change their suppliers. The disadvantage for borrowers seeking external funding 
between small firms and financiers is highlighted by Keasey and Waterson, (1993) and 
Berger and Udell, (1998). The latter examine the effect of asymmetric information on the 
lending relationship between banks and small firms in the U.S. They find that informational 
opacity constrains small firms from obtaining large amounts of external funding.  Small firms 
are more likely to get access to external equity from venture capitalists, and rely less on banks 
when compared with other types of firms.  
 
Others argue that a strong banking relationship can decrease the information problem, but 
with ambiguous results about the effect of such lending relationship on firm financial 
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constraints. The ‘inside’ bank could make use of its information advantage to make more 
informed credit decisions. However, the ‘outside’ banks would charge a higher interest rate 
when a firm switches, (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). The empirical evidence on this topic is 
also mixed. Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that small firms tend to borrow from banks which 
provide them informational intensive financial services. They suggest that firms that have a 
longer lending relationship would have easier access to credit funds. Similarly, Berger and 
Udell (1995) find that small firms with longer banking relationships are more able to borrow 
at lower rates and have a lower probability to pledge collateral than other small firms. The 
information gathered from a longer term relationship is used to refine the loan contract terms. 
In contrast, Houston and James (1996) find that an exclusive strong banking relationship 
would have a negative effect on high-growth firms, while, a multiple lending relationships 
had a positive effect.  
 
Some studies focus on the decision of the banks to explore the relationship between 
information and the banks’ lending decision. Berger et al (2005) argue that small banks are 
better able to collect and act on soft information
1
 than large banks. Large banks are most 
likely to lend to big firms with a good credit record, since they are less willing to lend to 
‘informationally opaque firms’. Using survey data for Japan, Uchida et al (2008) supports the 
findings of Berger et al (2005). The empirical evidence shows that the large firms tend to 
dictate the relationship with large banks, while small banks are most likely to have a stronger 
relationship with small firms. The conclusion is that small banks have a comparative 
advantage in processing soft information and delivering relationship lending.  
 
Bharath et al (2007) measures the direct benefit to the bank from relationship banking. They 
find that the degree of information asymmetry increased the likelihood of banks winning the 
borrower’s future loan contract. Furthermore, the firms conducting IPOs had a higher 
probability to maintain the current lending relationships. Sapienza (2002) finds that bank 
mergers decrease the supply of loans to small borrowers and it increases the probability of 
firms eliminating the lending relationship with the incumbent bank. In conclusion, larger 
firms have a higher probability to switch banks, while small firm choose to maintenance their 
current borrowing channel. 
 
2.2 The impact of specific characteristics of switching behaviour  
Recent papers have explored the impact of characteristics specific to the lending 
relationship, in terms of firms, banks and the market structure, on the firm switching 
behaviour. The probability of a firm switching banks is due to the heterogeneity in the firm’s 
                                                 
1  Soft information is the internal information about the investing project cannot be credibly 
communicated from firm to non-relationship banks. 
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characteristics, such as firm’s size, age, intangibles, constraints, leverage and so on. These 
studies have not analysed switching costs specifically, but they provide some evidences of the 
determinants that affect the firm-bank relationship and switching actions. Harhoff and 
Körting (1998) examine the role of the lending relationships in determining the costs and 
collateral requirements for external funds with survey data of small and medium-sized 
German firms. They find that the duration of the lending relationship and financial distress 
have a negative impact on collateral requirements; while the number of lenders and the age of 
the firm have a positive effect on collateral requirements. Ongena and Smith (2001) use 
Norwegian data to support the view that the value of the bank-firm relationship declines 
through time and firms tend to end the lending relationship to avoid ‘lock-in’. Moreover, they 
find that the switching costs are not high enough to prevent firms changing banks frequently.  
 
Detragiache et al (2000) using matched bank-firm data examine the impacts of firm and bank 
characteristics on the probability of maintaining a single banking relationship. The results 
show that the profitability of firms has a positive impact on maintaining a single banking 
relationship, while firm size and leverage has a negative one. Similarly, Farinha and Santos 
(2002) analyse the single and multiple firm-bank relationship choice. They observe that 
almost all firms borrowed for the first time from a single bank, but at some point some 
borrow from additional banks. They find that the likelihood of a firm substituting a single to a 
multiple relationship increases with the duration of that relationship. The results also show 
that this kind of switching is more likely to occur for firms with more growth opportunities 
and for firms with poor performance.  
 
Using a large loan sample from 1990-2006 in US lending market, Gopalan et al (2011) 
examine why firms switch to new credit providers. They find that transparent
2
 firms are more 
likely to form a new banking relationship. Firms that form a new lending relationship will 
usually secure a larger loan amount after the switch. As for the switching decision, firms are 
more likely to switch from small banks to large banks.   
 
In addition to the determinants of switching, Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) focus on ‘the time 
to change’ and study the loan conditions and bank behaviour when firms change lenders. 
They distinguish between two types of banks, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. The former is the bank 
that has a loan relationship with the firm in the past 12 month, while the latter does not. Using 
Bolivian data  their empirical results indicate that turning to a new bank (‘outside’ bank) leads 
to a substantial drop in loan rate, then after a period of about one and a half years, the ‘new’ 
(now ‘inside’ bank) bank started increasing its loan rate. After three years, the loan rate will 
                                                 
2 They use three variables to measure firm’s information quality: firm’s size, long term credit rating and 
the number of security analysts following the firm’s stock. 
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be back to its level before the change. They claim that this bank strategy is consistent with the 
existence of hold-up costs in bank-firm relationships. They also highlights that information-
sharing regime is very important for banks selecting firms. 
 
2.3 Relevant studies about China bank-firm relationship  
    Although many Chinese studies have concentrated on the bank-firm relationship, only a 
few focus on the effect of asymmetric information on switching costs, and the determinants of 
why firms switch banks. Huang (2003) studies the impact of a firm’s listing on the lending 
relationship using a logistic framework. The author denotes the existence of a lending 
relationship as 1, and 0 otherwise and finds that the performance of the firm increases the 
likelihood of developing a lending relationship prior to  listing. However, the performance of 
firms will be less important for lending decision after firm listing.  Clearly the act of listing 
makes more information about the firm available, which effectively lowers the banks’ 
information collecting costs. Using survey data with 308 questionnaires from firms’ senior 
executives, Liu and Mei (2009) analyse the determinants of the continuance or termination of 
a banking relationship. They claim that switching costs are the main determinant for firms’ 
maintaining the lending relationship with the incumbent bank.  
 
Based on the survey data of World Bank on 1186 SMEs in China, He and Wang (2009) study 
the impact of bank-firm relationship on the growth of firms. They find that the longer the 
duration and the greater the number of lending relationships, the slower the growth of firms. 
They report that large firms have a high probability to switch banks.  
 
Chang et al (2009) study the impact of information from the lending relationship on loan. 
They distinguish information as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’, which stand for the publication information 
and the information arising from repeated lending respectively, and focused the research on 
the economic role of banks’ soft information. They find that soft information and firm size 
have a significant negative effect on the duration of both short and long lending relationship.  
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Model and Hypotheses 
    Consider a firm that has no financial resources and wants to implement a project and 
borrows from bank. In period 0, the project return (cash flow) is denoted as  . The 
investment (borrowing) cost is (   )  , where   is bench interest rate. As in Vesala (2007), 
we separate firms (loan applicants) as good credit firms (G) and bad credit firms (B). Denote 
Q as the quality of the firm. 
 
                              {
  (         )               (   )    
  (        )                  (   )    
                        (1) 
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As with Von Thadden (2001), we make two assumptions: first, good firms consume any 
profit after period 0; second, outstanding debts of bad firms are forgiven. Under the 
relationship lending of this period, information is gathered by the lender beyond the relatively 
transparent data available in the financial statements. For non-relationship banks transparent 
information is costless to acquire and they can obtain  part of the opaque information, but not 
as completely as the relationship bank can. 
 
In period 1, firms face a new round of borrowing procedures. Firms that have a relationship 
with an incumbent bank is denoted as ‘inside’ bank (and otherwise they are ‘outside’ bank).  
We assume the ‘inside’ bank has better information of the firm, but with a ‘noisy signal’. 
Denote    the probability that a good credit firm will be viewed as good, and      as the 
probability that it will be viewed as bad. Better performances of firms ensure that they have 
higher probability to be viewed as good, which is     
 
    (  (   )  )
 , where    . Let    
be the probability that a bad credit firm will be viewed as a bad firm, and denote      as the 
probability that a bad firm will be viewed as good. Symmetrically, worse performances of 
firms ensure that they have higher probability to be viewed as bad firm, which is    
 
   (  (   )  )
. Hence the ‘inside’ bank still has the information advantage      (
 
 
  ). 
 
Given the existence of asymmetric information between firms and ‘outside’ bank, the ‘outside’ 
bank has a higher probability to misjudge the quality of firms. Similar to the setting in Sharpe 
(1990), the probability that an ‘outside’ bank views a good firm as good is given by    
   
 
  , where      . Then the probability being viewed as a bad firm is     . 
Symmetrically the probability that an ‘outside’ bank views a bad firm as bad is    
   
 
  , 
and the probability viewed as a good firm is     . It is clearly that       and      .  
Denote    as the probability that a bank is willing to lend to a good credit firm, and let    be 
the probability of the bank lending to a bad credit firm. Since a firm in a good credit state has 
a higher probability to get a loan, then      .  
 
If a firm chooses to process the lending relationship with the incumbent bank, the value of the 
loan it may get is denoted as       , which is an index of the loan quality consisting of loan 
amount (  ), duration ( ) and interest rate ( ). While          stands for the value of loan 
offer that comes from ‘outside’ bank. Hence,                 
  
   
   , where    .The 
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expected value of the firm staying with the current bank-firm relationship for repeated 
borrowing is given by: 
 
                           {
      (    )                         
      (    )                           
                (2) 
 
The expected value of firm switching its bank is given by: 
 
                             {
[     (    )  ]                        
      (    )                           
            (3) 
 
Then, 
                     {
[
   
 
(         )    ]                        
[
   
 
(         )    ]                         
           (4) 
 
Transaction costs will be incurred when firm changes their credit supplier. Denote   as the 
transaction costs, then firms looking for better funding from banks in period 1, can be denoted 
as                        . Let 1 stand for switching, 0 for non-switching. Hence the 
decision equation of firms’ switching is given by: 
 
                                               {
                       
                       
                               (5) 
 
i) Switching behaviour and deal terms: 
Rewrite equation (7) as the probability of switching determination. Hence: 
 
    (           ) 
{
 
          
[(         )   ]          
   
 
(         )   
                
         
[(         )   ]          
   
 
(         )   
                
     (6) 
 
Clearly, in equation (8) there are 
 (                  )
   
    and 
 (                  )
  
  , which 
suggest that more favourable the offer (large amount of loans (  ) and longer lending duration 
( ) from ‘outside’ banks, results in a higher probability for firms switching banks. The first 
hypothesis is given as: 
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H1: Given that the information asymmetry is a barrier for firms’ switching to new banks; 
there is a higher probability to switch when firms get access to more favourable credit than 
remaining with incumbent banks. 
 
Firms need to choose between a relationship and a non-relationship bank for their repeat loan. 
As Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) argue turning to a new bank is a defining moment for both 
the firm and its current lenders, firms often take the strategic decision at the highest level. 
Switching costs arise from asymmetric information acting as a barrier for switching, which 
implies that favourable loans are the key motivation for firms to switch Hence, the next 
hypothesis is that more generous lending contracts from ‘outside’ bank will drive firm to 
switch. 
 
ii) Loan demand and firm’s characteristics: 
Firms are willing to form new lending relationship when they get more attractive loans from 
an ‘outside’ bank. Published or shared information relating to transparency and reputation are 
important, (like firm size and financial condition). Under the condition of equation (6), the 
following conditions hold 
 (                  )
  
   
 (                  )
  
  ; otherwise, 
 (                  )
  
   
 (                  )
  
  . These results suggest that higher cash flow 
and transparency increase the likelihood for firms to switch. Usually larger firms are more 
transparent that small firms (Elyasiani and Goldberg, 2004; Stephan et al, 2009). Hence larger 
firms have a higher probability to change banks. Thus the second hypothesis is: 
 
H2: Given the asymmetry of information between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ banks, the more 
transparent a firm is and in better financial health, the greater the probability that it will form 
a new lending relationship. 
 
The average Non-performing loans ratios of Chinese commercial banks decreased 
continuously, from 7.1% in 2006 to 1.0% in 2011. The largest decrease has been the large 
commercial banks group, from 9.7% in 2006 to 1.0% in 2011. Given the existence of 
asymmetric information between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ banks, the ‘outside’ bank have a 
greater difficulty to get a firm’s internal credit information. Therefore, transparent firms are 
more attractive to ‘outside’ banks.  In contrast, borrowers with poor financials may be 
constrained to repeat borrow from their relationship lenders (Diamond, 1989). Firm size is 
likely to have a positive relationship with information transparency (Lin et al, 2007; Stephan 
et al, 2009). Furthermore, firm size usually reflects the bargaining power of the larger 
borrower (Harhoff and Körting, 1998). In summary, the more transparent a firm (larger firms) 
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is and the better the financial conditions of the firm is, the greater the likelihood that the firm 
will switch.  
 
iii) Loan supply and bank’s characteristics: 
Lending decisions are widely observed as heterogeneous between different banks. Large 
banks that are usually considered as nonaggressive to poach new customer, (known as the ‘fat 
cat’ effect  of Farrell and Klemperer, 2007), tend to have a lower probability to lend. While 
small banks or banks with low profitability have higher likelihood to lend, even to ‘risky’ 
borrowers, as part of a strategy of increasing market share and improving future profitability. 
Small banks are also usually more efficient than larger banks in collecting “soft” information, 
which makes them more willing to preserve or create bank-firm business relationships 
(Berger et al, 2005). Hence the lending probability (    ) is affected by bank characteristics, 
which can be written as:       (                    ) . The following hypothesis 
addresses the effect of bank characteristics on switching.  
 
H3: Firms are more likely to switch to small banks for credit needs than large banks. Low 
profitability banks are more attractive to firms since they have a higher likelihood to satisfy 
firms’ credit requirement. 
 
The banking industry is heterogeneous in China and has a mix of large and small banks with 
intense local competition in the market. The five largest commercial banks dominate the 
market with a greater than 50% market share. The national joint-stock banks collectively have 
second highest share with city commercial banks and rural commercial banks  competing at 
the provincial level. It is argued that small banks are more eager to extend their business and 
have higher propensity to lend than large banks
3
. Large banks usually rely more on 
observable firm characteristics in making lending decision than small banks (Cole et al, 1999), 
which implies they are less willing to lend than small banks under the same conditions of 
information asymmetry. Furthermore, small banks are more efficient at lending to small firms 
than large banks (Sapienza, 2002) which supports the argument that medium and small firms 
are more likely to switch to small banks.  
 
3.2 Empirical models 
    Based on the above analysis, the determination of a firm switching is a function of deal 
terms, characteristics of firm and bank and can be written as: 
   
           (                                                    )     (7) 
 
                                                 
3 Evidence of this is reported in Ferri (2009) 
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 As with the many relevant empirical studies, firms’ classification and bank-firm relationship 
dummy variables have been added into the model As in equation (8) : 
 
                                                              (8) 
 
, where the            stands for the switching behaviour,    indicates the deal terms
4
,     is 
a set of firms’ characteristics variables,    stands for the banks characteristics and    indicates 
the bank-firm relationship variables. Note that             indicates the firm switches the 
lending relationship. In the above equations, the deal terms includes, the amount of the loan, 
the duration of the loan and a dummy denoting if collateral was required for the condition of 
the lon. The set of firms’ characteristics  include firm size, cash flow ratio and discriminant 
variables of firms’ classification (private own enterprise, medium size and small firms). 
While market share of bank, non-interest income ratio, bank’s ROA and large commercial 
bank dummy belongs to bank’s characteristics variables, the number of firm’s relationship 
banks and firm’s previous borrowing from large bank belongs to bank-firm relationship 
variables. The details of variable definition are listed in Table 1: 
 
Table 1: Variables definition 
Variables Definition Unit 
Switching 
A firm borrows from a bank which did not have a loan 
relationship with the firm during last 12 month, denote 
switching=1; otherwise switching=0 
- 
Amount of loan 
(Amount) 
The amount of money of each loan contract CNY 
Duration of loan 
(Duration) 
The duration of each loan contract Year 
Collateral 
Whether collateral is required when a firm borrowing from a 
bank. Collateral needed=1; otherwise=0 
- 
Total asset of firm 
(Tasset) 
Annual total asset of firm CNY 
Total sales of firm 
(Firmsales) 
Annual total sales of firm CNY 
Cash flow ratio 
(Cashflows) 
Firm’s annual net cash flow over total sales % 
Private enterprise 
(Private-Own) 
Dummy variable to distinguish the private enterprise and 
state-own enterprise. Private enterprise=1, otherwise=0 
- 
Agriculture b 
Dummy variable for industry Classification b. 
Agriculture industry=1, otherwise=0 
- 
Manufacture c 
Dummy variable for industry Classification. 
Manufacture industry=1, otherwise=0 
- 
Real estate d 
Dummy variable for industry Classification. 
Real estate industry=1, otherwise=0 
- 
Energy e Dummy variable for industry Classification. - 
                                                 
4 Interest rate has not been included into the model, since Chinese banks were not free to price their 
loans until after Oct 2004. 
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Energy industry=1, otherwise=0 
Services f 
Dummy variable for industry Classification. 
Services industry=1, otherwise=0 
- 
Medium and small firm 
(M-S firm) 
Statistical definitions of medium-sized and small enterprises 
from National Bureau of Statistics of China g. Denote that  
medium and small firm M-S firm=1; otherwise equal to 0 
- 
Market share of bank 
(Marksh) 
Bank’s loan over total loans in the market % 
Total asset of bank 
(Bankasset) 
Annual total asset of bank CNY 
Non-interest income 
ratio 
Bank’s non-interest income over total gross income % 
Bank’s return on asset 
(Bankroa) 
Bank’s net profit over total earning assets % 
Large commercial bank 
(Large bank) 
Large commercial bank=1, otherwise=0 - 
Banking market 
concentration ratio 
(HHI) 
The sum of the squares of the market shares of the five largest 
banks 
- 
a
 Industry Classification here according to "Listed Company Industry Classification Guidelines (2012 
Revision)", China Securities Regulatory Commission. 
b 
Agriculture: Farming, forestry, animal, 
husbandry and fishing industry. 
c
 Manufacture: Manufacture Industry. 
d 
Real estate: Real estate 
industry. 
e
 Energy: Production and Supply Electric Power, thermal Power, gas and water industry. f 
Services: Wholesale, retail, trades hotels and catering services industry. 
g
 Statistical definitions of 
medium-sized and small enterprises table is attached in Appendix A1. 
 
The first step of the analysis is to estimate the impact of firm’s characteristics and deal terms 
on the propensity to form a new banking relationship. This paper analyses the relationship 
between post-switching banks’ characteristics and new banking relationship. Since Switching 
is only available from the borrower’s 2nd deal onwards, the empirical studies drop the first 
deal in the regression. The specific model on switching is: 
 
                                                                
                                                                                     (9) 
The specific model for the relationship between post-switching bank characteristics and 
firm’s preference when switching is: 
 
                                                        
                                                                                                        (10) 
The final stage is a robustness check shown as: 
 
                                                           (11) 
, where     stands for banking market concentration ratio.  
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4. Data 
Data on corporate characteristics is obtained from the CSMAR (China Securities Market 
and Accounting Research) database. Financial reports of China banks are taken from the 
Bankscope database. Firms are matched to banks with the corresponding lending deals. We 
exclude borrowers that are in the financial services sector. We take past deals to code 
switching, therefore the data only contains the deal from the 2
nd
 borrowing. The sample 
includes 311 firms and 41 banks
5
, from 1999-2012 with 2102 matched data. However, the 
sample is unbalanced because of a lack of data in some years but since these gaps appear at 
random, they should not affect the estimation in any other way other than reducing the sample 
size (Wooldridge, 2009).  
 
The data shows that 51.5% firms switched. Firms are more likely to switch to a multiple 
bank-firm relationship instead of maintaining a single lending relationship; only 25% of firms 
maintained a single bank-firm relationship after switching. 84.1% of the lending relationship 
in our sample is multiple bank-firm relationship. 77.1% firm’s previous borrowing is with 
large commercial bank in each lending period. 
 
The average deal amount is 89835613 CNY; the highest and lowest loan amount is 
259000000 and 1500000 respectively.  All deals involve a single lender. The average lending 
duration is 1.528 year. 68.4% deal durations are between 1-2 years. The data covers only 
listed firms. But firms are heterogeneous in size. The largest total asset is 1.38E+11 RMB, 
while the smallest is only 5,220,090. The average cash flow to total sales ratio (%) is negative, 
with the value of -3.616. The average debt ratio is 57.437. As to bank characteristics, there is 
a big gap between the highest and lowest market share. The largest market share is that of 
ICBCI, while the lowest is the market share of Deyang City Commercial Bank. Besides the 
market share index, the dummy variable large bank is also used to distinguish large banks and 
others. The statistic shows that 54.4% borrowing deals are with large banks. Table 2 
summarises the data. 
 
 
Table 2:  Summary Statistics 
 Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
              Dependent variable 
Switching  2102 0.511 0.497 0 1 
               Deal Characteristics 
Ln(Amount) 2047 17.498 1.158 14.220 22.386 
                                                 
5 The sample includes 5 large commercial banks, 12 joint-stock commercial banks, 19 City and Rural 
commercial bank, and 5 foreign banks.  
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Ln(1+Duration)  1802 0.811 0.401 0.077 3.060 
Collateral 2102 0.738 0.439 0 1 
                Firm Characteristics 
Ln(Tasset) 2102 21.557 1.035 15.468 25.651 
Ln(Firmsales) 2097 20.853 1.323 15.469 25.838 
Cashflows  2095 -3.616 39.186 -81.412 39.186 
Private-Own 2102 0.077 0.267 0 1 
Agriculture 2102 0.021 0.146 0 1 
Manufacture 2102 0.471 0.499 0 1 
Real estate 2102 0.164 0.371 0 1 
Energy 2102 0.048 0.231 0 1 
Services 2102 0.142 0.349 0 1 
M-S firm 2012 0.264 0.440 0 1 
                   Bank’s Characteristics 
Marksh (%) 1882 7.613 0.396 0.021 24.176 
Ln(Bankasset) 1886 14.550 1.514 2.805 16.554 
Non-interest income ratio (%) 1884 13.420 1.356 7.585 21.406 
Bankroa (%) 1865 1.245 0.897 -0.282 34.063 
Large bank 2102 0.544 0.498 0 1 
                   Market Characteristic 
HHI 2102 714.305 105.102 564.589 941.224 
 
 
5. Empirical results 
        A switching action is defined as a firm borrowing from a bank that it did not have a loan 
relationship with in the previous 12 months. Hence, the dependent variable switching is a 
dummy variable either 0 or 1. As in many other studies the probit method is used to estimate 
the regression models. Since many of the driving variables are likely to be endogenous the 
probit model with continuous endogenous (ivprobit) was used for the following empirical 
studies
6
. All data in the regression are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  
 
5.1 New lending relationship, Deal terms and firms’ characteristics 
The estimates for the determinants of the probability of switching are shown in Table 7. The 
outcomes provide evidence that the probability of a firm switching its bank is determined by 
deal terms, firm characteristics and bank-firm relationship. In table 3, Ln(amount) has the 
significant positive effect for firms to form new borrowing deals, which says  that the loan 
target is one of the key factors driving firms to switch. When separating the sample into 
switching and non-switching groups, the statistics shows that the average amount of loan in 
the switching group is 35.6% higher than in the non-switching group. Duration has a 
significant positive effect on the probability of switching. The average loan contract duration 
increase from 1.31 year to 1.73 year after switching. Since a longer contract usually implies a 
                                                 
6 Lagged terms of Firm’s characteristics have been selected as instrument variables except for dummy 
variables. 
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more stable relationship, it is expected that firms prefer a long and stable lending relationship. 
It is also the case that a longer relationship means more information filtered to the banks 
(Farinha and Santos, 2002). Hence the bank prefers to offer a longer contract to their new 
clients with good credit. The above results support hypothesis 1. Collateral has no significant 
effect on firms’ behaviour in the regressions. 
 
Regarding firm characteristics, Ln(Tasset) (firm size) shows a signification positive 
relationship with switching behaviour in column (2)-(6), which suggests that large firms have 
higher probability to form a new banking relationship. It is usually assumed that firm 
transparency is positively correlated with firm size (Elyasiani and Goldberg, 2004; Stephan et 
al, 2009), the positive relationship shows than more opaque firms are less likely to switch 
banks.  
 
Asymmetric information can contribute to the lock-in power of banks. But more transparent 
firms can decrease the asymmetry of information and suffer less from the unobserved 
switching costs. This result is consistent with Stephan et al (2009) and Gopalan et al (2011) 
results. Another firm characteristic is Cashflows (cash flow ratio), which has a significant 
positive effect on switching banks. A high cash flow ratio is indicative of better firm 
performance. Firms with higher internal cash flows ratio and good performance will be less 
reliant on the incumbent relationship, which drive firms to a higher likelihood of switching. It 
is also the case that they are attractive to the ‘outside’ banks. These results support hypotheses 
2.  
 
The variable Private-own has an insignificant effect, which show that there is no difference in 
switching behaviour between state-owned or private-owned enterprise. The heterogeneity of 
the industries is evidenced in the regression. The regression results show that the firms in the 
Energy and Service industry have higher likelihood to switch banks. 
 
Table 3: The determinants of deal terms and firms’ characteristics on switching 
 Pr(Switching) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
               Deal terms 
Ln(amount) 
0.118*** 
(3.951) 
0.114*** 
(3.776) 
0.112*** 
(3.724) 
0.121*** 
(4.174) 
Ln(1+Duration) 
0.174** 
(2.095) 
0.168** 
(2.012) 
0.172** 
(2.073) 
0.165** 
(1.989) 
Collateral 
-0.037 
(-0.536) 
-0.051 
(-0.726) 
-0.043 
(-0.614) 
 
          Firm characteristics 
Ln(Tasset) 
0.106*** 
(3.058) 
0.082** 
(2.406) 
0.084** 
(2.500) 
0.085** 
(2.550) 
Cashflows 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
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(2.439) (2.153) (2.252) (2.228) 
Private-own  
0.075 
(0.067) 
0.154 
(1.342) 
0.136 
(1.203) 
 
Agriculture  
0.066 
(0.288) 
  
Manufacture  
-0.145 
(-1.565) 
  
Real estate  
-0.144 
(-1.385) 
  
Energy  
0.316* 
(1.948) 
0.377** 
(2.458) 
0.368** 
(2.395) 
Services  
0.365*** 
(3.181) 
0.429*** 
(4.223) 
0.430*** 
(4.224) 
C 
-4.362*** 
(-5.594) 
-3.373*** 
(-4.770) 
-3.838*** 
(-4.945) 
-4.010*** 
(-5.223) 
Wald Chi
2
 69.46 98.87 98.04 94.81 
Obs 1781 1781 1781 1781 
Prob: Wald test of exogeneity
7
 0.424 0.384 0.435 0.443 
Note: Z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
5.2 The propensity to form new banking relationship based on bank characteristics 
This part of the analysis examines the relationship between bank characteristics and the 
likelihood of maintaining a lending relationship. The details of the loan deal is likely to be 
correlated with bank characteristics, so following the lead of Gopalan et al (2011), duration of 
loans
8
 is not including in the following probit model with continuous endogenous (ivprobit) 
regressions. We control for the firms’ characteristics and bank-firm relationship variables in 
these regressions, but do not report the results in the following table other than banks’ 
characteristics (available on request). The results are presented in table 4. 
 
Table 4: Post-switching bank characteristics and new banking relationship 
 
Variables 
Pr(switching) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
MARKSH 
-0.020*** 
(-3.989) 
-0.016*** 
(-3.119) 
-0.021*** 
(-3.965) 
  
MARKSH*M-S firm  
-0.029*** 
(-2.681) 
   
BANKROA 
-0.241*** 
(-3.252) 
-0.211*** 
(-2.838) 
-0.206*** 
(-2.711) 
-0.206*** 
(-2.783) 
-0.171** 
(-2.295) 
Bankroa*M-S firm 
 
Large Bank 
 
 
-0.193*** 
(-2.770) 
 
-0.186*** 
(-2.692) 
  
-0.268*** 
(-4.279) 
-0.269*** 
(-4.272) 
NON-INTEREST 
INCOME RATIO 
-0.093*** 
(-3.601) 
-0.094*** 
(-3.627) 
-0.092*** 
(-3.528) 
-0.095*** 
(-3.714) 
-0.094*** 
(-3.650) 
                                                 
7 Wald test of exogeneity do not reject the null that there is exogeneity in the regression. 
8 When bank facing liquidity crisis, they are tending to make a loan in a short term other than long 
term. 
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C 
-2.887*** 
(-2.942) 
-3.670*** 
(-3.491) 
-4.039*** 
(-3.601) 
-2.932*** 
(-3.004) 
-4.043*** 
(-3.617) 
Wald Chi
2
 105.63 111.66 110.76 106.40 112.33 
Obs 1812 1812 1812 1812 1812 
Prob: Wald test of 
exogeneity
9
 
0.454 0.488 0.482 0.455 0.477 
Note: Z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
In column (1), (2) and (3), market share of banks shows a significant negative relationship 
with switching. This implies that larger the market share of the bank, the lower the probability 
of switching. The variable large bank shows a similar result in column (4) and (5). The results 
show that the average amount of borrowing from large commercial banks is 41.4% less than 
firms borrowing from smaller commercial banks. The argument is that smaller banks are 
more aggressive in expanding, they usually have higher propensity to lend than larger banks. 
The significant negative result of joint variables (market share*medium-small firms) in 
column (2) suggests that medium-small sized firms are more likely to form new relationships 
with small market share banks than large firms
10
.  
 
In table 4, the variable Bankroa shows a significant negative relationship with switching. This 
says that banks with low profitability have high propensity to lend, since interest income is 
the main revenue resource for Chinese banks. The significant negative results of joint 
variables (market share*medium-small firms) in column (3) and (5) suggest  that medium-
small size firms are more likely to form new relationship with this kind of bank, since they 
are more opaque than large firms. The results above show strong evidence of support for 
hypothesis 3. Interestingly, the results show that the higher the non-interest income ratios of 
bank, the lower the probability of firms switching. The argument goes that a bank that has a 
higher proportion of its revenue generated from non-interest services will be more able to 
lock-in firms with offering a bundle of services alongside loan.  
 
5.3 Robustness check 
A common finding in the literature is that small and medium sized firms in China have 
difficulty in obtaining financial support from banks (Lin, 2007), especially for private 
enterprises who do not have government connection. This could result in small and medium 
sized private firms have a higher likelihood of remaining with their incumbent banks. Table 5 
presents some robustness checks on the previous results.  
 
                                                 
9 Wald test of exogeneity do not reject the null that there is exogeneity in the regression. 
10 Consistent with findings of Berger et al. (2005) and Gopalan et al. (2011) 
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In column (1) and (2), other Private-own and Private-own *M-S FIRM variables are 
insignificant, which suggests the medium size and small private firms in the sample (all listed 
firms) have not shown significant switching preference difference with others.  
 
 
Table 5: The determinants of firms switching banks 
 
Variables 
Pr(switching) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
          Deal Terms 
Ln(Amount) 
0.145*** 
(4.518) 
0.157*** 
(5.527) 
0.161*** 
(5.679) 
0.162*** 
(5.763) 
0.143*** 
(4.699) 
0.144*** 
(4.983) 
0.126*** 
(4.407) 
Ln(1+Duration) 
0.122** 
(2.247) 
    
 0.105** 
(2.013) 
Collateral 
-0.003 
(-0.044) 
0.043 
(0.572) 
0.058 
(0.761) 
0.046 
(0.612) 
0.025 
(0.311) 
 
 
     Firm Characteristics 
Ln(TASSET) 
0.128*** 
(3.264) 
   
0.094** 
(2.169) 
0.085** 
(1.985) 
0.077** 
(2.268) 
Ln(Firmsales)  
0.082** 
(2.544) 
0.075** 
(2.344) 
0.078** 
(2.467) 
 
 
 
CASHFLOWS 
0.002** 
(1.975) 
0.001* 
(1.886) 
0.001* 
(1.707) 
0.001* 
(1.832) 
0.002** 
(1.974) 
0.002** 
(1.981) 
0.002** 
(2.282) 
Private-own 
0.284 
(1.364) 
0.189 
(0.941) 
0.082 
(0.738) 
 
0.057 
(0.507) 
 
 
Private-own*M-S FIRM 
-0.252 
(-1.004) 
 
-0.151 
(-0.635) 
  
 
 
Energy      
0.285* 
(1.885) 
0.411** 
(2.768) 
Services      
0.294*** 
(3.460) 
0.469*** 
(4.980) 
    Bank characteristics 
MARKSH  
-0.019*** 
(-3.775) 
  
-0.020** 
(-3.919) 
-0.019*** 
(-3.665) 
 
Ln(Bankasset)   
-0.121*** 
(-5.316) 
-0.262*** 
(-4.152) 
 
 
 
BANKROA  
-0.251*** 
(-3.334) 
-0.168* 
(-1.860) 
-0.216*** 
(-2.868) 
-0.247** 
(-2.666) 
-0.231*** 
(-3.190) 
 
NON-INTEREST 
INCOME RATIO 
 
-0.089*** 
(-3.422) 
-0.093*** 
(-3.622) 
-0.091*** 
(-3.504) 
-0.091*** 
(-3.229) 
-0.095*** 
(-3.710) 
 
              Market  
HHI     
-0.0001 
(-0.405) 
 
 
C 
-5.383*** 
(-6.176) 
-2.853*** 
(-3.042) 
-1.446 
(-1.485) 
-2.879*** 
(-3.131) 
-2.562 
(-0.812) 
-2.497** 
(-2.559) 
-3.979*** 
(-5.147) 
Wald Chi
2
 72.74 104.55 116.51 101.06 105.87 116.09 92.89 
Obs 1781 1812 1812 1812 1812 1812 1781 
Prob: Wald test of 
exogeneity
11
 
0.372 0.416 0.457 0.444 0.451 0.488 0.337 
Note: Z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                                                 
11 Wald test of exogeneity do not reject the null that there is exogeneity in the regression. 
19 
 
19 
 
As a robustness check, we use total sales as a proxy for firm size and total bank assets as a 
measure of market penetration (instead of market share).  In column (3) and (4), Firm total 
sales gives the same effect as Firm total asset to switching behaviours, which again confirms  
the finding that big firms are more likely to form a new banking relationship. In column (3), 
the impact of Bank asset is significantly negative, this again is consistent with previous result 
that firms tend to switch to small banks. 
 
As with other studies we add a banking market concentration variable as a control for the 
market structure (Herrera and Minetti, 2007; Uchida et al., 2008), to check the robustness of 
the results in table 7 and 8. In column (5), market concentration (HHI) shows no significant 
relations to switching, but other variables results are consistent with the previous regressions. 
 
6. Conclusion 
    This paper finds that firm-bank switching behaviour in China conforms to the findings of 
other studies. Using firm-bank matched data over 1999-2012, we examine why firms switch 
to new banks for their repeat loans instead of staying with their relationship banks. We define 
a switching action as a firm borrowing from a bank which it did not have a loan relationship 
with in the last 12 month. Unsurprisingly, the results provide evidence that the chief 
determinant of switching action stems from firm credit needs, as well as firm and bank 
characteristics.  
 
We find that firms usually switch banks for larger amount of loans and longer lending 
durations. However, collateral requirement of lending has no significant effect on firms’ 
switching behaviour. 
 
As large firms are usually considered less opaque than small firms (Elyasiani and Goldberg, 
2004; Stephan et al, 2009), the study finds a positive relationship between firm size and the 
probability of bank switching. Firms that have a better ability to generate cash from its sales 
are more likely to form a new bank relationship, since they are attractive to banks and can 
easily acquire new loans.  
 
We also find that firms are more likely to switch to small market share banks, or lower 
profitability banks, since these banks are more aggressive to extend their business and take 
risk to earn profit, which will results in more loans for firms. Banks that offer a bundled 
service of loan and bank services will have are more able to lock-in firms to maintain a 
current lending relationship.  
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Statistical Definitions of Large, Medium-sized and Small Enterprises (newest) 
Industry Branch Index Unit Large Medium-sized Small 
Farming, forestry, 
animal husbandry and 
fishing 
Operating income (Y) 10,000                              
Industry 
Employees (X) People                            
Operating income (Y) 10,000                                 
Construction 
Operating income (Y) 10,000                                 
Total assets (Z) 10,000                                 
Wholesale 
Employees (X) People                       
Operating income (Y) 10,000                                  
Retail trades 
Employees (X) People                        
Operating income (Y) 10,000                               
Transport 
Employees (X) People                            
Operating income (Y) 10,000                                 
Storage 
Employees (X) People                          
Operating income (Y) 10,000                                 
Post 
Employees (X) People                            
Operating income (Y) 10,000                                 
Hotels 
Employees (X) People                          
Operating income (Y) 10,000                                 
Catering services 
Employees (X) People                          
Operating income (Y) 10,000                                 
Soft and scientific 
research, technical 
services 
Employees (X) People                          
Operating income (Y) 10,000                                
Real estate 
Operating income (Y) 10,000                                   
Total assets (Z) 10,000                                  
Property Management 
Employees (X) People                             
Operating income (Y) 10,000                               
Leasing and Business 
Services 
Employees (X) People                          
Total assets (Z) 10,000                                   
No specified industry Employees (X) People                          
Source: National bureau of statistics of China. 
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Table A2: List of banks in sample 
Type of Bank Name of Bank 
Large 
commercial 
bank 
Industrial and commercial bank of China 
Agricultural bank of China 
Bank of China 
China Construction Bank 
Bank of Communications 
Joint-stock 
commercial 
bank 
China Citic bank 
China Everbright Bank 
Huaxia Bank 
Guangdong Development Bank (China Guangfa Bank) 
Shenzhen Development Bank (Pingan Bank) 
China Merchants Bank 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 
Industrial Bank 
China Minsheng Banking Corporation 
Evergrowing Bank 
China Zheshang Bank 
Bohai Bank 
City and Rural 
commercial 
bank 
Bank of Beijing 
Weihai Commercial Bank 
Bank of Shanghai 
Bank of Jiangsu 
Harbin Bank 
Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank 
Bank of Ningbo 
Bank of Dalian 
Shanghai Rural Commercial Bank 
Bank of Nanjing 
Bank of Hangzhou 
Jiaxing Commercial Bank 
Wenzhou Bank 
Huishang Bank 
Bank of Jiujiang 
Baoshan Bank 
Bank of Guangzhou 
Bank of Chengdu 
Harbin Bank 
Foreign bank 
HSBC Bank (China) 
Bank of East Asia (China) 
Citibank (China) 
DBS BANK (China) 
Nanyang Commercial Bank (China) 
 
